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**GEOPOLITINIŲ  
STUDIJŲ CENTRAS**

***“Frozen” conflicts: solution perspectives,  
dynamics and consequences***

**Conference material**

**2007**



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## **Minutes of the Conference**

On 24-28 July 2007, the Lithuanian Centre for Geopolitical Studies and the Centre of International and Regional Policy of St.Petersburg organized a Summer Academy in Dubingiai, Lithuania. Participants of the conference analyzed conflicts in Moldova and Trans-Dniester region, Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the role of the third countries in managing these conflicts. Professional political analysts, politicians, diplomats, representatives of public and civil organizations, youth from the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Trans-Dniester region (Moldova), Georgia, territories of Georgia - Abkhazia and South Ossetia investigated the reasons of conflicts in the post-soviet space, as well as their forms, dynamic and consequences, looked for possible solutions, ways for conflict regulation, involvement of relevant mediators etc.

During work sessions participants had an opportunity to listen to presentations of representatives of conflicting countries, Lithuania, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Poland on the situation in the zones of „frozen“ conflicts, on their consequences, possible ways for settling these conflicts as well as on the role of third countries (Russia, EU, different EU states, international organizations) in facilitating or continuing negotiations and looking for the ways out from the existing situation.

Working groups of the Summer Academy have also prepared analysis of conflicts of Moldova and Trans-Dniester (Moldova), Georgia and Abkhazia (Georgia) and South Ossetia (Georgia), as well as scenarios for possible developments of events in these regions and on possible compromise acceptable to both parties in conflict.

According to organizers of the conference the key outcome of the executed work are efforts of different parties to talk and understand each other. The public initiative of the Summer Academy has extended the informative-analytical discourse on „frozen“ conflicts in the post-Soviet space of the EU countries (among them – Lithuania), which lack objective information on events and processes in these regions.

### **I. „Frozen“ conflicts: conflict resolution opportunities, dynamic and after-effects**

#### **1. Baltic and Black Sea Region: geopolitics and interests**

**Nikolay Mezhevich** (*Director, Center of Neighborhood Co-operation, School of International Studies, State University of St.Petersburg, St.Petersburg, Russia*).

The speaker highlighted interests of Russia in the region, as well as Russia's concern about the policy executed by certain state entities in the region.

According to him, it is natural that Russia as a great state seeks to increase its impact in the Baltic and Black Sea region and that other geopolitical players try to intervene



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into Russia's actions.

Territorial boundaries of the current Russian Federation mainly coincide with the borders of Russia of Peter the First times. Correspondingly the interests of Russia in the region are to pursue wider (military and trade) penetration into the Baltic and Black Seas. According to the Russian experts, the key principle of the United States' strategy in the region is to establish a continuous cordon between Russia and Western Europe.

According to N.Mezhevich the Russian analytical community negatively evaluates the attempts to push Russia out“ from the region. Eventually this might transform into huge confrontation. The Russian experts highlighted that historically borderlands of the Baltic and Black Sea Region are unstable. Therefore resolution of „frozen“ post-Soviet space conflicts initiated by Russia might become a catalyst for a joint revision of borderlands after the fall of the USSR if Russia will further be prevented from consolidating in the Baltic and Black Sea Region.

**Boris Tumanov** ([www.geopolitika.lt](http://www.geopolitika.lt)), *author of articles, political analyst-journalist, Moscow, Russia*).

The key thesis of the presentation was that today the Russian foreign policy is often irrational. According to B.Tumanov, first of all both - the Russian nation and the current elite of the country feel „offended“, therefore their anger for the collapse of the USSR and subsequent misfortunes of Russia is directed towards the entire world. Secondly, oil has „struck the heads“ the elite of the country considering that Russia can say „no“ everywhere and always. However, the worst thing is that policy of the country has become responsive. In other words „no“ is said not where it would be appropriate but in response to each action of the West, irrespective of its nature. According to B.Tumanov, the case of Kosovo is one of the examples of irrationality of the Russian foreign policy.

B.Tumanov said that Kosovo is a classical precedent for managing „frozen“ conflicts, and if Russia recognizes independence of Kosovo according to the plan of the United Nations, it would have free hands for resolving similar conflicts in the post-Soviet space (first of all in Georgia). However, the Kremlin is further stubbornly resisting the plans of the United States and Europe on regulation of the Kosovo conflict.

At the end of presentation B.Tumanov asked: what would be Russia's actions if Georgia suddenly changes its Euro Atlantic orientation to totally pro-Russian? Will Moscow further support separatist regions of Georgia as is the case today?

**Jonas Čekuolis** (*Chairman of Commission, Commission of NATO affairs, Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius.*)

At the beginning of his presentation J.Čekuolis made a short overview of theoretical



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sources of the geopolitical discipline (starting from H.Mackinder and finishing by S.Huntington). He said that the world has changed and that today we must think carefully on whether classical geopolitical theories could further be applied to the current world, based on bipolar confrontation logics. According to him, mondialism theory of Z.Brzezinski is more adequate since it propagates a model of „one world“ based on the liberal democratic values logically correlated with the vision of the „end of history“ of F. Fukuyama.

Today Lithuania belongs to the space of a liberal democratic world and its goal is to help Eastern European and Caucasus states integrate into these spaces in order to make them stable and prosperous (Euro Atlantic integration could help to finally solve all the old territorial problems of these countries). According to J.Čekuolis, there is no reason for Russia to be afraid of this process and/or struggle against it. On the contrary, it should seek closer relationship with the West. However, in order to maintain sound and constructive relations, Russia must learn to play according to Western rules.

### **Comments**

Oleksiy Haran (*Professor, Kiev Mohyla Academy, Ukraine*). Today Russia is worried not about the issues it should worry. Instead of confronting it should co-operate with the West against the growing China and turbulent Islam world.

Valery Buivol (*Party of Christian Conservators – Byelorussian Popular Front, Minsk, Belarus*). Russia is a traditional imperialist power, i.e. the empire of evil and prison of nations.

Aleksey Dobychin's (*Coordinator, International Youth Organization “Proryv”, Moscow, Russia*) comment was the most radical during the conference. According to him the current Russian elite (its representatives could be called pragmatics) will be replaced by the national patriots, who will eventually switch off gas for the EU states which are most hostile towards Russia. Besides, the order in Russia will change in principle, and it will come back to a certain model of monarchy, the key advantage of which is continuity of power. While responding to J.Čekuolis remark that Russia has to play according to rules of the West, A.Dobychin highlighted that Russia, as great state which is never going to reject imperial ambitions, will not play according to certain rules but will create these rules itself. Although this comment seems to be quite marginal, it is assumed that it deserves attention, and Europe should be prepared for such a scenario.

George Khutsishvili (*Director, Center of International Negotiations and Conflicts, Tbilisi, Georgia*). Policy is what we make of it. In other words confrontation or cooperation is more a choice of politicians rather than an issue determined by circumstances.



## **2. „Frozen“ conflict of Moldova and Trans-Dniester. Will the countries come to an agreement? And what is the price of this agreement?**

**Cornel Ciurea** (*Lecturer, Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of Moldova, Chisinau, Moldova*)

At the beginning of presentation the expert revealed a very interesting idea: the more efforts are made in order to solve the Trans-Dniester conflict, the worse the result is. In other words, if nothing is done, conflict might disappear naturally. Then C. Ciurea distinguished several dimensions allowing to better understand the „freeze“ of the conflict.

- Dimension of elite. Supporters of this theory highlight that there is no conflict between Moldova and Trans-Dniester, and that certain groups of elite of both sides are interested in the continuous escalation of the conflict (in this case aspects of distribution of power and financial benefit dominate).
- Dimension of ideology. It was expected that after communists came to power in Moldova, conflict would be resolved, however, these expectations fell flat.
- Dimension of ethnicity. Sometimes people of Trans-Dniester say that real Moldavians seeking close relationship with Russia live in Trans-Dniester, whereas Moldavians residing in Moldova are more inclined to cooperate with Romania. Consequently, both parties cannot come to common understanding. However, this argument is not justified.
- Dimension of geopolity. The essence of this theory is that resolution of the Trans-Dniester conflict depends on the Russian position.

According to C. Ciurea, the above theories are not extensive, although each of them has rational background. A group of Moldova's experts which had to find actual reasons of the Trans-Dniester conflict and ways for solving this conflict, made a conclusion that implementation of 3D strategy (demilitarization, decriminalization and democratization) regarding a separatist region first of all depends on geopolity, i.e. on the Russian position, although negotiations involve (besides Russia, Trans-Dniester and Moldova) Ukraine (as a possible future mediator beside or without Russia, while having in mind the already existing „Youshchenka's plan“) and OSCE.

Here one can recall the so called „Kozak's plan“ suggested by Moscow, which was coordinated with all the interested parties; however it collapsed during the very last moment since president of Moldova Vladimir Voronin suddenly refused to sign it.

The situation after collapse of this plan has become more acute. Today Trans-Dniester does not want to join Moldova, and Chisinau raises the idea of Moldova as unitarian state. Rumors are currently heard on the secret negotiations between president V.Voronin and Moscow and elaboration of a new „Kozak's plan“. Notably supply of the Moldavian wine to the Russian market has been renewed (wine and gas are two key Moldova's suppression levers in the hands of Moscow). Developments of the



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above situation are not yet clear, however the agreement reached some time ago gives a hope that regulation of the Trans-Dniester region in principle is possible.

At the end of his presentation C. Ciurea said several words on the relation of conflict to other „frozen“ post-Soviet conflicts and on Kosovo case. According to him today we have *de facto* situation when all the above conflicts are in „one bag“, although actually their similarity is doubtful. However, according to C.Ciurea, the practice in the nearest future will not change.

Finally, C.Ciurea's opinion on the concept of „frozen“ conflicts was negative, i.e. the concept applied currently in describing the cases of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Karabachos etc. According to him this concept has a negative implication preventing from searching for possible solutions.

**Aleksey Martynov** (*Executive secretary, Joint Assembly of Unrecognized Countries, Moscow, Russia*).

It should be noted that speech of A.Martynov was single-sided, defending exceptionally the interests of Trans-Dniester and this was done consciously. According to the speaker, conflict of Moldova with Trans-Dniester commenced from the development of Russo phobia in the country and its active Romanization after the fall of the USSR.

According to him, today Trans-Dniester is an efficiently functioning state structure. The region has a defined territory and population, quite a successful half-state market economy (according to A.Martynov, regarding the rumors on smuggling, the international commission has proved that they are not justified) and well functioning political authorities. The level of democracy in the region is quite high and this is indicated by the institute of referendum actively applied in making key political decisions.

At the end of his presentation A.Martynov emphasized that today the option of federation with Moldova as a means for solving the Trans-Dniester conflict is not adequate for practical realities, and the only way out is independence of the Trans-Dniester region.

**Viktor Guzun** (*Chairman, Republican youth organization “Molodezhnoe obnovenie”, Tiraspol, Trans-Dniester, Moldova*)

The author analyzed several aspects.

1) He highlighted the „invaluable“ role of Russia in the conflict. According to him, the Russian Army No 14 suspended the war, and today it is not Russia delaying the process of withdrawal of its army from the Trans-Dniester region, but the citizens of the country themselves want the Russian soldiers to stay in Trans-Dniester as a



guarantee of security.

2) According to V.Guzun, the most important thing for Trans-Dniester region is to have strong economy. He said that the current economic development of the region is quite successful, and that living standards in the region are higher than in Moldova. Therefore for Trans-Dniester the Moldavian economic model is unacceptable, since it does not ensure improvement of life quality in Moldova.

3) According to V.Guzun, mentality of citizens of Moldova and Trans-Dniester is different. Therefore the option of (con)federation is not considered in Trans-Dniester anymore and the region seeks total independence. Regarding ethnos as the basis of a nation, the speaker noted that nation can be formed not only on ethnical, but also on political basis.

The speaker rejected accusations on insufficient level of democracy in Trans-Dniester and mentioned the officially adopted trilinguallism as one of the strongest manifestations of democracy in the region (three official languages are used in the region: the Ukrainian, Moldavian and Russian).

### **Comments**

Petru Bondari (*Student, department of Economic Law, Perspectiva University, Chisinau, Moldova*). Today there is no conflict between the people residing in Moldova and Trans-Dniester. The problem of unification arises because of the elite of both sides using the current situation for meeting own interests. Especially this concerns the criminalized authorities of Trans-Dniester.

Olga Manole (*head of Department, Promo-lex Association, Moldova*). The level of democracy in Trans-Dniester is very doubtful. Referendums organized in the region are not recognized by an international community and most probably are fabricated by the authorities of Trans-Dniester. In terms of the Russian peacekeepers, they *de facto* execute instructions of Tiraspol but not the assigned peacekeeping mission.

Vadimas Volovojus (*Expert of PI „Center of Geopolitical Studies, Lithuania*). Similarities and differences of the current „frozen“ conflicts have to be considered at least within the academic discourse, so as not to make the search for problem solving more problematic due to their artificial uniformity.

### **3. „Frozen“ conflicts in Georgia – cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The role of Russia and EU Member States in conflict regulation.**

**David Aptsiauri** (*Ambassador of Georgia in Lithuania*)

At the beginning of his presentation the Georgian ambassador in Lithuania praised our country for a successful resolution of the problem regarding minorities during the





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very initial stage of independence of the country.

The key idea of his presentation was that both Georgia and its separatist regions have to finally forget the past and reject stereotype thinking towards each other (as one of the examples of the stereotype thinking he mentioned the concept of „frozen“ conflicts by suggesting to move to the concept of „problem“) and start searching for a peaceful way out from the situation via dialogue and compromise.

According to him, a socio-economic factor should form the basis of the agreement: development of economic attractiveness of Georgia and close cooperation of people. Georgia is different today. First of all significant progress has been reached in the sphere of economy (through reforms), and living standards of citizens are also gradually increasing. Secondly, the investment climate in the country has also improved, and this allows foreign capital to come to Georgia. Thirdly, the status of the country has significantly changed in the international stage. Today Georgia declared its ambitions in the sphere of Euro Atlantic integration and this allows the country to develop closer relationship with the West.

Regarding Russia: the Georgian ambassador highlighted that its role as a mediator in the process of restoration of territorial integrity of the country is inevitable and noted that this process has to be internationalized with a view to increasing its efficiency (of course, he has in mind possible involvement of EU and/or NATO) and expressed a hope that Moscow's attitude towards the problem and Moscow's policy will become more constructive.

**Shamili Adzinba** (*Vice Chairman, Committee of Youth Affairs and Sports, Abkhazia, Georgia*)

Sh. Adzinba started his presentation from the historical facts. He presented several important historical moments. Firstly, according to him (and this is important, since the opinion of Georgia's representatives regarding historical facts is different), Abkhazia and Georgia joined the Russian empire not at the same time. Secondly, Abkhazia and Georgia became members of the USSR also separately. Thirdly, in 1927 Stalin made autonomy from Abkhazia within the Georgian SSR. Fourthly, before the war, during the times of the fall of the USSR, the Abkhaz considered the option of confederation with Georgia, but the Georgians started the war and the above option did not matter anymore. Finally, according to Sh. Adzinba, it was buried by Eduard Shevardnadze. Today the Abkhaz do not believe in Georgia and consider that *de facto* their status within Georgia would not be properly respected.

Therefore, today Abkhazia firmly declares its strive for independence; but, differently from South Ossetia, intending to join North Ossetia and become part of the Russian Federation, Abkhazia does not want to join Russia. One of the arguments in this case is the aspect of return of the nationals to the country (the Abkhaz, residing currently in Turkey and other countries, would rather return to the independent Abkhazia than to



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Russia). On the other hand, the Abkhaz relate its growth guarantees with Russia. Close ethnic cohesion with certain nations residing in the Russian Federation makes their pro-Russian orientation even more intense. Finally, the Russian passport for the Abkhaz people opens the gates to the world.

**Rolandas Kačinskas** (*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, Department of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Head of the Russian division, Vilnius, Lithuania*)

In his presentation R.Kučinskas spoke about the problems of „frozen“ conflicts in the post-Soviet space within the context of relationship of the EU and Russia. Theoretically both Russia and the EU should be interested in accelerated regulation of these conflicts in order to make their neighbors more stable and secure. However, in practice cooperation of the EU and Russia is not smooth regarding „frozen“ conflicts.

On the one hand this is because of Russia’s skeptic attitude towards the Neighborhood Policy (new EU Member States contribute to its development quite actively) initiated by the EU. Russia evaluates this policy as interference into the zone of interests of Russia. On the other hand, the values of Russia and the EU are still different and prevent from coming to a consensus. However, there are several factors, restricting the policy of the EU in the post-Soviet space. First of all the EU cannot decide on the general strategy regarding CIS countries. Secondly, the decision-making mechanism of the EU so far is ineffective and this does not allow the EU to adequately respond to different international events.

According to R.Kačinskas, resolution of „frozen“ conflicts is one of reflections of the relationship between the EU and Russia. Therefore, the extent of cooperation of both sides in the future will depend on the general context of their relationship. Lithuania as member of the EU and NATO could be more active in the process of regulation of these conflicts, but only under a collegial principle, since active involvement requires more active economic performance in these regions, whereas Lithuania does not have enough resources for independent actions.

## **Comments**

A. Dobychin’s comment was attributed to the ambassador of Georgia in Lithuania. According to him, conciliation of the parties is impossible due to Georgia’s wish to join the EU and, most importantly, the NATO. South Ossetia and Abkhazia don’t like this perspective, since these regions one or another way relate their future to Russia, for which the development of NATO towards the East is unacceptable.

Vadimas Volovojus. It is very difficult to expect close cooperation of Russia and the EU in solving „frozen“ conflicts within CIS space. R.Kačinskas was absolutely right to say that cooperation of both sides regarding this issue will depend on the general context of this relationship. Notably, today this context is quite negative, and there is



no background for a better situation. The new European leaders in France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain etc. are not so favorable regarding V.Putin as their predecessors, and their dialogue with Russia is becoming more intensive. However, even if Europe is interested in solving the problem of „frozen“ conflicts in the post-Soviet space together with Russia, Moscow is not interested to do that together with the Europeans. This is not only because Moscow (as correctly noted by R.Kačinskas) evaluates the EU Neighborhood policy (including active contribution of new EU Members States) as interference into the zone of Russia's interests; Russia's attitude towards practical readiness of the Europeans to solve these problems is very skeptical; according to Russia the Europeans could hardly join the process of negotiations and peacekeeping in the separatist regions. Thus, today it is difficult to speak about the EU and Russia as perspective partners in CIS space.

## **II. Conflict resolution**

### **1. Is peaceful conflict resolution possible? Experience of the Baltic States, Poland and Ukraine. Conflict resolution scenarios.**

**Vytautas Ališauskas** (*Expert of the Democratic Policy Institute, Vilnius, Lithuania*)

In his presentation the expert spoke about the disagreement of Russia and Lithuania regarding the fact of occupation by Russia.

V. Ališauskas made a brief overview of the occupation history by highlighting the Resistance Movement in Lithuania (initially military, then – civil resistance) and that the Western world has never recognized Lithuania's occupation.

According to the speaker, the relationship between Lithuania and Russia is quite problematic and Russia actually refuses to accept the fact of Lithuania's occupation. It is interesting that Moscow, while recognizing Lithuania as a sovereign country *de jure*, in practice is still questioning its independence and self-sufficiency (e.g. requires exceptional rights for military transit to Kaliningrad, does not want to return the building of the Lithuanian embassy in Italy etc.).

Such a „frozen“ conflict between Lithuania and Russia after Lithuania joined the EU turns into a conflict between the EU and Russia.

**Kęstutis Krikščiūnas** (*Advisor to the Minister, Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius, Lithuania*)

The speaker started his presentation from the statement that living standards of the EU Member States are much higher than those of the majority of CIS countries. There is considerably less poverty and criminality in the EU than in the former USSR states. At the same time the EU is interested in stable and secure states. Therefore it is very important to allow the citizens to express their will on where and with whom they



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want to co-exist. The EU welcomes these initiatives and is ready, pursuant to the Neighborhood Policy, to provide assistance to the countries willing to become part of the Euro Atlantic space.

For some time Lithuania has been one of the most active EU Member States executing the Eastern policy of the EU. According to K. Krikščiūnas, the best dialogue is maintained between Lithuania and Georgia, since this country has clearly defined its guidelines. More problematic is cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova which do not have a clear vision of the country as a national state.

K.Krikščiūnas highlighted that the EU does not want to impose its position to anyone. Whereas Russia tries to interfere into internal affairs of its neighbors with a view to influencing their choice. Therefore most probably it would be more effective to internationalize the process of regulating „frozen“ conflicts so as to leave less space for Russia and to provide more space for the EU, OSCE and other third subjects.

**Robertas Rokickis** (*2nd secretary of the Polish Embassy in Lithuania, Vilnius, Lithuania*)

In his report Robertas Rokickis revealed the Polish experience in regulating various conflicts, however, he acknowledged that this experience is not extensive.

When speaking about „frozen“ conflicts“ he said that in such cases everything is determined by „big players“. Regarding Kosovo these are in the first place the EU, NATO and the United States. Regarding „frozen“ conflicts in the post- Soviet space, Russia plays the key role.

In principle, Poland, similarly as the United States, supports the development of „freedom space“ and, if needed, it could, together with Lithuania, participate as negotiators in the negotiation process in solving the above CIS space conflicts, since these countries in any case have certain negotiation experience in Ukraine and the European Union.

**Bonifasijs Daukšts** (*Advisor on political issues, the Latvian Embassy in Lithuania. Vilnius*)

The speech of the Latvian representative was short and concise. He highlighted several key moments relevant (according to speaker) to resolution of „frozen“ conflicts in CIS space.

Firstly, the principle of territorial integrity of the states should not be questioned. Secondly, the peacekeeping mission in relevant regions should be internationalized, and the role of the European Union should be extended in the first place. Thirdly, it is difficult to forget the war, and time is needed to forget all the painful experiences.



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It is assumed that some day regulation of „frozen“ conflicts in CIS space could be expected.

**Oleksiy Haran** (*Professor, Kiev Mohyla Academy, Ukraine*)

In his presentation the expert exchanged his views on why Ukraine manages to escape from the permanently developing fragmentation of the country.

Today in Ukraine key decisions are made by political oligarchic clans. However, these clans prevent Ukraine from fragmentation. For oligarchs this is not useful, since fragmentation could destroy their business. Politicians, pressed by the same oligarchs, try to avoid division of the country, and understand that civil chaos is less useful than permanent search for compromise. Finally, the nation also does not want fragmentation of the country and politicians have to take the nation's opinion into account. Therefore, according to O.Haran, a compromise should eventually be reached (though fragile, but compromise) irrespective of the high political tension in Ukraine.

O.Haran highlighted that regarding „frozen“ conflicts and possible role of Ukraine in regulation of conflicts, Ukraine participate in the process as mediator, however all conflict parties (Georgia, Trans-Dniester or Karabachos) should consider Ukraine as a reliable actor. Otherwise it is no use in getting involved in these conflicts. Strict position of Abkhazia and South Ossetia not to join Georgia surprised the expert and he acknowledged that it is quite difficult for him to make any suggestions on problem resolution.

**Vincuk Viachiorka** (*Chairman, the National Front Party of Belarus, Minsk, Belarus*)

V.Viachorka did not speak too much about „frozen“ conflicts“, he only mentioned that the principle of territorial integrity of the states should be respected and that it would be expedient to involve such institutions as EU and NATO into the process of regulation of „frozen“ conflicts. His presentation was more about the developing social economic crisis which might have quite serious political consequences.

There are several reasons of the approaching crisis. First of all the increased prices of oil and gas import from Russia. Consequently for many Byelorussian companies it will be difficult to retain their profitability. As could be guessed, the Kremlin executes a deliberate pressing policy towards Belarus with a view to taking over its strategic industrial branches. Aleksandr Lukashenka and local entrepreneurs do not like this perspective, however, it could be expected that president of Belarus sooner or later will place part of the country's economy at the disposal of the Kremlin in order to remain in the power and calmly hand over the post to his son. Therefore the opposition has nothing to do but try to use the potential of protest of the national business. Secondly, there are more and more people in Belarus who want to „life



freely“ and relate their future either to „the independent Belarus“ or Europe.

Thus, if in the nearest future the current Byelorussian regime will not be able to solve financial problems, related to various financial obligations and efficiency of the country's economy, the wave of discontent might arise in the country due to political dictatorship.

### **Comments**

According to Valery Gusuyev (*Student, Mariupolsk State Humanitarian University, Ukraine*) Ukraine could be a natural mediator in „frozen“ conflicts of CIS space, especially regarding Trans-Dniester (Moldova is neighbor of Ukraine, whereas Georgia is more important strategically). However, actually Ukraine cannot execute absolutely free policy in this sphere, since it is pressed by the EU, the United States and Russia, which in principle are key decision-makers regarding „frozen“ conflicts in CIS space.

Maksim Gvindzia (*Vice Minister on foreign relations, Abkhazia, Georgia*). In case if the EU starts applying certain mechanisms for cooperation with separatist regions of CIS space, this could be considered as *de facto* recognition of these regions from the side of the EU. Therefore the EU's possibilities of participation in the process of regulation of „frozen“ conflicts in CIS space should be evaluated reservedly.

### **2. The role of the third countries in conflict resolution. The third countries interfere into conflicts due to humanitarian reasons or due to selfish reasons, such as...?**

**Ramūnas Davidonis** (*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, Department of Security Policy, advisor to the NATO division, Vilnius, Lithuania*)

Presentation of R. Davidonis was one of the most constructive and specific during the conference. It dealt with the NATO interests and performance in CIS space.

According to the speaker, there are two principle catalysts of NATO actions – values and interests. According to him, the Kosovo operation from the side of NATO most a value oriented action. After the fall of the USSR the organization was referred to as *no actions talks only*, however today the situation has changed. NATO manages to successfully adjust to the changing world: it has turned from an entirely military block to a political organization; officially extended volumes of its activity and is constantly developing its military capacity and takes part in various missions.

Within CIS space, NATO is active only where it feels mutual interest. In other words, the organization is in active cooperation with Georgia and has been developing (for a certain time period) its relationship with Ukraine, i.e. with the countries which have clearly declared their Euro Atlantic integration ambitions. Today contacts with



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Ukraine have weakened, since there is no clear agreement on future of the state inside the country. Moldova is evaluated by NATO as a stage of the EU activity and is not going to interfere into this process. According to R.Davidonis, NATO is also not going to interfere into the regulation of Karabachos conflict.

At the end of his presentation the speaker touched upon the relationship between NATO and Russia and highlighted quite ambiguous position of Moscow regarding this issue. On the one hand Russia maintains quite active cooperation with NATO in various areas (rescue operations, struggle against terrorism). On the other hand, Moscow has not yet executed Istanbul's commitments on withdrawal of the army from Trans-Dniester (according to Moscow these commitments were „extruded“ from inadequate Boris Yelcin). Besides, Russia unambiguously supports Georgia's membership in NATO. Thus on the one hand Russia considers NATO its strategic partner, on the other hand – is afraid of the block's approach to its borders. However, according to R.Davidonis, such a behavior is a typical quality of the Russian diplomacy.

**Mažvydas Jastramskis** (*Analyst, Centre of Strategic Studies, Vilnius, Lithuania*)

According to the speaker, Kosovo today is one of the most successful examples on resolution of „frozen“ conflicts. The plan of Achtisaari is quite balanced and perspective (better than nothing). Thus the example of Kosovo could be applied as a certain background for resolution of „frozen“ conflicts of the post-Soviet space. However this precedent differs from the latter cases in several aspects.

In order to speak about similarity of „frozen“ conflicts of Kosovo and CIS space, it is necessary to extend the format of negotiations and eliminate the actual Russian peacekeeping monopoly in these regions. Obviously, the EU and/or NATO or, e.g. GUAM countries could also participate in this process.

In conclusion, it could be said that equalization of negotiations and peacekeeping process of conflicts in Georgia, Trans-Dniester and Karabachos according to the Kosovo example gives certain hopes for their regulation.

**George Khutsishvili** (*Director, Center of International Negotiations and Conflicts, Tbilisi, Georgia*)

In his presentation the expert tried to provide a theoretical overview of “frozen“ conflicts by dividing the parties into three groups, where A and B – direct conflict parties, and T – a third party. The third party can perform the following four roles in conflict resolution:

- Facilitator: the third party facilitates conditions of negotiations between direct parties of conflict;
- Mediator: the third party considers the essence of conflict and provides



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- impartial assistance in conflict resolution
- Arbitrator: the third party takes active part in conflict as a mediator and might impose sanctions as arbitrator regarding direct conflict parties without having own interest in the conflict;
- Stakeholder: the third party takes active part in conflict regulation process with a clearly defined own interest.

Regarding Russia's role in the process of resolution of „frozen“ conflicts in CIS, the country can be qualified as a stakeholder, supporting one of the parties of the direct conflict. Therefore the role of Russia as mediator in these conflicts is questionable. It would be expedient to involve other third party into the negotiation process, i.e. the party with the same rights as Russia. According to G. Khutsishvili, the EU could become an above new player and perform the role of mediator-arbitrator.

At the end of his presentation the expert said several words on Kosovo case. According to him, the current decision is purely political without any background for compromise. Therefore, in case it is implemented, its consequences will probably be negative.

**Vytautas Landsbergis** (*deputy of the European People's Party and European Democrats in the European Parliament, member of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, member of Security and Defense Sub-Committee, Vice-Chairman of the European Parliament's Delegation to the EU-Armenia, EU-Azerbaijan and EU-Georgia Parliamentary Cooperation Committees, a substitute member of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety*).

As usually Vytautas Landsbergis speech was mainly directed towards criticism of the Russian policy. According to him, Russia has deliberately „frozen“ CIS space conflicts with a view to reaching the actual geopolitical occupation of certain regions. Russia, while theoretically being a mediator in these conflicts, actually is a partially interested actor of these conflicts. According to V.Landsbergis, such „mediators“ should be eliminated from the process and new third parties shall get involved into resolution of „frozen“ conflicts in CIS space, i.e. the parties which contributed to resolution of Kosovo problem.

V.Landsbergis was convinced that the EU could become the only resolution of the post-Soviet separatism, or, to be more exact, the European idea, the in-depth understanding of which could encourage citizens of the separatist regions to make an adequate choice.

Today Russia wants to „break“ Europe (first of all psychologically) and this should not be allowed. In principle, the Russians could be in one side of barricades with the Europeans, however, for that Russia needs assistance in order to protect from itself.





## Comments

Vadimas Volovojus tried to critically evaluate M.Jastramski's position on Kosovo as a successful example of regulation of „frozen“ conflicts. In principle the suggested decision satisfies the Western community, however, is not accepted by Russia and, most importantly, by Belgrade (as a direct party of conflict). Therefore hardly the success of the case can be considered, let alone the situation of the Serbians of Kosovo, the majority of which were forced to leave the country. In general, „key“ players of „frozen“ conflicts seek their interests and their relationship in this case is based on the principles of game with zero sums.

*P.S.* Some speakers could not come to the conference. Their presentations were translated and presented as an annex.

## Presentation of Working Groups and their comments

### *1st group (Abkhazia)*

The group was presented by Olga Manole. At the beginning of her presentation she briefly touched upon the historical issues and highlighted that after the end of the war between Georgia and Abkhazia, Sukhumi has been suggesting (for quite a long time) to Tbilisi the option of federation, however, the Georgians rejected this proposal.

This Working group considered Abkhazia, Georgia and Russia as direct conflict parties. According to the group, Russia is to be attributed to direct conflict parties since from the very beginning it supported Abkhazia (e.g. supplied it with guns during the war). The second participant according to O.Manole was North Caucasus region. The third subjects of conflict were the United Nations, OSCE and the Red Cross.

While touching upon the issues related to Abkhazia and Georgia, O.Manole said that Georgia is mostly concerned about the withdrawal of the Russian army from its territory, whereas the Abkhaz want to become stronger as a nation in developing their culture and economy (first of all tourism) and encourage the return of their nationals to Abkhazia. In terms of the issue of status, Tbilisi suggests to Sukhumi wide autonomy within Georgia, whereas Sukhumi declares unambiguously the strive for independence from Georgia.

What could be a decision in such a situation? In the first place it should be highlighted that the war has imprinted painful experiences between the countries and today these are the key obstacles in the search for compromise. Secondly (and regretfully) Georgia omitted a perfect opportunity to solve the conflict when Abkhazia suggested the option of a federal co-existence. In terms of the future one aspect is clear: everybody understands that current situation prevents the Abkhaz and Georgian



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nations from normal living; however, the decision will not be made tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, since this requires time. The above options of autonomy and federation could become the basis for future negotiations. Results of negotiations will depend on the will of politicians of Abkhazia and Georgia and on the external factor, the impact of which (according to the group members) should be minimized in principle.

### **Comments**

Boris Tumanov was an expert of the 1st group and decided to exchange his views on the discussion. He didn't like the accusations of representatives of Georgia and Abkhazia regarding the current situation. This lasted until Maxim Gvindzia pronounced the magic words: „We need time“. Suddenly the Georgian representatives agreed with him. B.Tumanov tried to specify what time is needed for. First of all both countries have to calm down. Secondly, they have to understand the realities of the existing situation. Thirdly, they have to consider on whether the current situation meets their expectations regarding historical perspective. Fourthly, they have to look for a formula of agreement, and the search for this formula should become easier with the time due to clarification of the common situation.

George Khutsishvili approved the methodology for conflict analysis suggested to Working Groups, especially the methodology for specification of parties. He also agreed that time is needed for regulation of conflicts and highlighted that direct parties of conflict have to permanently observe and analyze the changing geopolitical dynamic (its possibilities and risk in Caucasus region), since resolution of conflict is inseparable from the regional context. This should be done together and it is high time to stop threatening each other. Probably assessment of the situation will eventually provide a mutually understandable and acceptable decision.

### ***3rd group (Trans-Dniester I)***

The 3rd group decided not to include the discussion of the historical part of the Trans-Dniester conflict in its presentation, since, according to practice of all participants of the conference, both sides of the conflict evaluate history differently, and this prevents from conveyance of an objective historical picture within a short period of time.

At the beginning group representative Vadimas Volovojus specified participants of the conflict: Trans-Dniester and Moldova as direct parties, Russia and Ukraine – secondary, and European Union – tertiary party. V.Volovojus said that it is necessary to highlight a very important moment of group discussion, related to the role of Russia. Theoretically Russia lays claims to the status of a secondary party of the conflict, however *de facto* it could be considered as direct party of conflict. However, this is an object of subjective evaluations. Ukraine is important since in the future it could be more actively involved in the process for regulation of the Trans-Dniester conflict as a natural mediator. The European Union is interested in conflict as a



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problem at the borderland of the block.

Romania, as member of the EU is also concerned about the Trans-Dniester conflict, however, currently the EU does not play a principle role in the conflict. The EU has the Neighborhood Policy, but it is not adequately worded and finalized. This, as well as the fact that today the EU is not a fully consolidated subject, prevents it from active involvement into the process of regulation of the Trans-Dniester conflict. Apart of Moldova, Trans-Dniester, Ukraine and Russia, OSCE is also an active participant of negotiations. However, in this case (as in many other cases) the OSCE as an instrument of the EU is practically incompetent.

The group also decided not to qualify interests of various parties to the Trans-Dniester conflict, since these interests have been specified long time ago. Therefore it proceeded with discussions on regulation perspectives and measures.

While speaking about the perspectives of regulation of the Trans-Dniester conflict, V.Volovojus noted that the principle attitude of the group is that resolution of the above conflict is possible. This was predetermined by the fact that some time ago a compromise has nearly been reached (Kozak's plan). Therefore it could be expected that in principle it is possible to regulate the Trans-Dniester conflict. Besides, this is not a key ethnic factor as in the case of Abkhaz/Ossetians and Georgians.

The 3rd group suggested a plan of three stages as an option for problem solving. During the first stage the status of co-existence of Moldova and Trans-Dniester should be defined. During the discussion representatives of Moldova proposed an autonomy, but this was not a compromise option which could satisfy representatives of Trans-Dniester. Therefore the agreement was made on the legal status of *confederation* as co-existence of two parties during the transitional period, which could become the second stage of conflict regulation. According to the representative of Ukraine, during this stage, processes of democratization, economic liberalization and decriminalization should take place in Trans-Dniester (and Moldova). In general, this transitional period (the parties should themselves specify its duration, for instance, 10 years) should become a real challenge for both Moldova and Trans-Dniester to help understand on whether they can live together.

In this case it is necessary to emphasize one moment – dislocation of the Russian army in Trans-Dniester. The Working Group reached compromise that Russian soldiers during the transitional period could stay in Trans-Dniester as a guarantee of security of the region; however, at the same time peacekeeping mission should be internationalized. Peacekeepers of the EU and/Ukraine could be the most acceptable alternative party. Referendum could be the third, the final stage of conflict regulation; it could be observed and acknowledged by the international community.

If there is no contraposition between the population of Moldova and Trans-Dniester, during the transitional period their closeness could increase and Trans-Dniester would



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vote for its co-existence within Moldova. Parties of the conflict could decide the form of living during the referendum by the end of the transitional period.

***4th group (Trans-Dniester II)***

Presentation of this group could be compared with the first presentation about Trans-Dniester.

Differently from the first, the second presentation started from a brief historical excursion. It was noted that common chaos situation, related to the fall of the USSR, predetermined the military conflict, as well as the law on the state language adopted in Moldova which, according to representatives of Trans-Dniester, discriminated the Russian speaking population.

Again, differently from the first presentation, the ones who prepared the second review highlighted that referring to the parties of conflict they talk not about the state but about the political forces. In other words, they indicated political powers (not the nations) of Moldova and Trans-Dniester as direct parties of conflict. Political authorities of Russia, Ukraine and the EU were specified as secondary parties; the United States and political authorities of OSCE - as tertiary parties.

According to speakers, the key issues regarding the Trans-Dniester conflict are the status of the region and composition of the peacekeeping mission. Regarding the latter the opinion was that it should be internationalized. Concerning the issue of status of Trans-Dniester (the way out from the existing situation) the speakers simply specified four possible options for development of the situation: independence of Trans-Dniester; Trans-Dniester within Moldova; continuity of the *status quo* situation; breakthrough in negotiations. It was added that most probably negotiations could be stimulated by separation of the third countries from the conflict by giving the way to „nation's diplomacy“. Certainly, the negotiations should be followed by the improvement of economic relations between Trans-Dniester and Moldova and at least mitigation of the information war between them.

**Comments**

Cornel Ciurea. Citizens of Trans-Dniester and Moldova are in permanent relationship at student, sportsmen exchange and other levels. Thus, there is no conflict between the people.

Shamili Adzinba, having participated in the work of 3rd group, suggested confederation as the status of co-existence of Trans-Dniester and Moldova during the transitional period; however, he was convinced that during the referendum the citizen would vote for independence. Hence, the transitional period will become an instrument of civilized separation. N.Mezhevich was also skeptic about the confederation as a starting position and noted that usually confederations end with



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separation. C. Ciurea was the only one who positively evaluated confederation and emphasized its symbolic significance – readiness of Moldova and Trans-Dniester for compromise (from the autonomy suggested by Moldova and independence highlighted by Trans-Dniester to confederation).

Oleksiy Haran negatively evaluated possible elimination of mediators from the conflict as a means for its regulation. Secondly, he noted that comparison of Trans-Dniester with South Ossetia and Abkhazia is not appropriate, since there separation from Georgia would be executed on the ethnic basis, whereas in case of Trans-Dniester this would be separation of part of the territory, which could create a very negative precedent in Europe. According to him, Moldova will objectively move towards membership in the European Union and Trans-Dniester will eventually join Moldova. Today Trans-Dniester exists only due to Russia and it will not be a viable structure in the long-term perspective.

Olga Manole. It is doubtful on whether Trans-Dniester today wants to join Russia. It is assumed that this is a will of 30% of the Russian speaking population but not of the Ukrainians or Moldavians. Hence, it could be stated that authorities of Trans-Dniester artificially create the discourse of Trans-Dniester's will to join Russia.

Radu Vrabie (*Program coordinator, Association of Foreign Affairs of Moldova, Chisinau, Moldova*). In any case, one could hardly call the regime of Trans-Dniester as a dictatorship (for the most part it could be referred to as authoritarian regime).

Denis Ilievic (*Vice Chairman, Republican Youth Organization "Molodezhnoe obnovenie", Tiraspol, Trans-Dniester, Moldova*). While speaking on the terms for resumption of negotiations between Trans-Dniester and Moldova, he highlighted that first of all it is necessary to terminate the economic blockage of the region and to proceed with execution of the formerly reached agreements.

Petru Bondari. Today Trans-Dniester survives, inter alia, on the basis of agreement between separate political and economic groups (concept „clans“ is avoided). However, recently Chisinau made a proposal to entrepreneurs of the region to legalize their business in Moldova; consequently more and more disagreements are between them and political authorities of Trans-Dniester, indicating that Trans-Dniester is an artificial structure.

*P.S.* Due to certain circumstances, the meeting of the Working Group on the analysis of the case of South Ossetia, did not take place.

In principle this case resembles (regarding implacability) the problem of Georgia and Abkhazia. There is only one subtlety: South Ossetia wants to finally join North Ossetia belonging to the Russian Federation and this prevents from searching the compromise between Georgia and South Ossetia. Maybe time will change the



incompatible positions of different parties.

### **Conclusions of the Summer Academy**

In summarizing the ideas and views expressed during the Summer Academy, the following concept theses, related to the perspectives for management of „frozen“ conflicts“ could be specified:

- The principle of territorial integrity of the states should be respected. In general one should agree with the idea of N. Mezhevich on the historical instability of borderlands of the CIS states, as well as on the danger regarding possible review of the borders. Therefore the necessity of respect of the principle of territorial integrity is unquestioned. However, the principle of territorial integrity should also be respected both within CIS space and with respect to Kosovo case, unless Kosovo is not considered a precedent for management of „frozen“ conflicts.
- More attention should be given to practical and academic comparative analysis of „frozen“ conflicts. C.Ciurea was right to say that today all the above conflicts are thrown *de facto* into one “bag” although their similarity is questionable; therefore an in-depth analysis is needed. Consequently this separation would provide for better regulation of conflicts.
- During the conference incompatibility of positions of parties of „frozen“ conflicts became obvious; time is needed in order to improve the situation. The conflict of Trans-Dniester provides most optimistic expectations. A compromise agreement which has nearly been reached once (Kozak’s plan) gives hope that conflict resolution satisfying the needs of both sides is possible. The situation regarding Ossetia and Abkhazia is more complex. Representatives of these regions do not want to join Georgia, they simply do not trust it. Therefore they see only one way out – preservation of *status quo*, by improving at the same time relations of conflict parties at national and/or official level. Maybe Georgia’s attractiveness, which has increased due to Euro Atlantic integration will eventually make Abkhazia and South Ossetia change their position; however, the hopes are very small, having in mind that South Ossetia, for example, wants to join Russia, which is strongly against Georgia’s membership in NATO.
- Russia’s role in „frozen“ conflicts of CIS space is highly questionable. Representatives of separatist regions emphasize a positive role of Russia in the peacekeeping and negotiation process. Another conflict party highlights destructive actions of Russia. Maybe time has come to internationalize peacekeeping missions and negotiation process in the separatist regions of CIS space so as to provide equals rights for the EU to take part, together with Russia, in these missions. It is assumed that this would help to reduce the current tension and increase objectivity of evaluations of incidents occurring in the zone of conflict.



## Appendix 1

**A dangerous amnesia<sup>1</sup>**

Prof. Françoise Thom, Sorbona University, France

On January 26 this year a huge event took place, barely noticed by the Western media: The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) passed a resolution condemning all totalitarian communist regimes, including the government of the former USSR. The amazing fact is that this resolution was passed so late, more than fifteen years after the collapse of the communist bloc. In fact, taking into account the strenuous battle which had to be fought to get the resolution adopted, it seems a miracle that the document was approved (actually the PACE resolution to approve the report passed narrowly with 81 in favor, 70 opposed, and some members not voting).

This leads us to ask ourselves why communism, unlike nazism, benefits from such a widespread amnesia, in Russia and in the West. The crimes of Communism have yet to receive an assessment from both historical and moral viewpoints. The reasons for this reticence are many and various. They are different in Russia and in the West, and have to be tackled separately.

**1) Russia**

Let us start with the debate leading to the vote of the PACE resolution mentioned above. The main opposition to the adoption of this document came from the Russian representatives. The politically varied Russian delegation presented a united front against the offending resolution. The desire to rebuff the Europeans brought together such political opponents as the communists, United Russia and the Fatherland Party. "We will all vote against the resolution, even if for different reasons," said Konstantin Kosachev, the head of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs. Kosachev claimed that not all communist regimes were criminal or violent, though he did not clarify how he categorized the Soviet Union in that regard. "Not everything that's red is blood, some of it may be tomato juice, Mr. Lindblad" -- he lashed out at the rapporteur during the official debate<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, Kosachev charged that the report seeks to assign to the USSR a share of the responsibility for the Second World War and the division of Europe. Finally, he contended that Communist ideology could not be grouped together with Nazi ideology under the category of "totalitarian." Implicitly excusing the former, Kosachev insisted that the report must not place those two ideologies on the same footing. "What right do you have to condemn communism, if Russia won the Great Patriotic War [World War Two] under the banner of the communist party?" Communist Party chief Zyuganov asked the political commission indignantly.

In Moscow, the Kremlin-linked political consultant Sergei Markov criticized the PACE report in a similar vein. He termed the document a "blow struck against Russia as successor to the communist Soviet Union." Moreover, according to Markov, PACE is "attempting to prop up the undemocratic regimes in the Baltic states,

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<sup>1</sup> Contribution to EPP-ED Study day, "The Reunification of European History", 7-8<sup>th</sup> June, 2006, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium

<sup>2</sup> Interfax, January 25, 2006



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Ukraine, and Georgia, the legitimacy of which rests on anti-communism"<sup>3</sup>. Imagine "German officials describing condemnations of Nazism as blows struck against today's Germany or feeling insulted by the pairing of Nazism with Communism as totalitarian ideologies"<sup>4</sup>.

Kosachev and Markov's remarks give us an insight in Russia's way of dealing with the communist past and in the reasons underlying the Russian attitude. The communist system is identified with the Russian empire. To attack communism amounts to weaken the Russian state. Imperial ambition is the main motivation behind the Russian denial of communist crimes.

Recent Russian historical works show how far this process has gone and by which devices the crimes of communism are swept under the carpet. Under Putin a vast enterprise of rehabilitation of Stalin is underway. Two books are perfect illustrations of this trend: V. Karpov's monumental biography of Stalin<sup>5</sup>, and Juri Zhukov's work on the purges of the thirties<sup>6</sup>. In Karpov's book Stalin is depicted as a Russian patriot, the builder of the Russian superpower who defeated both the "sionist" attempt to take control of the Russian motherland during Lenin's rule and the Western attack on Russia lead by Hitler (obviously the author thinks the first exploit should especially bring to Stalin posterity's gratitude). Communist ideology is interpreted as an instrument used by Stalin to realise entirely legitimate geopolitical ambitions. Purges are justified by the presence of real enemies of the Russian state. In Zhukov's book we find a similar approach, though less obsessed with the "sionist" theme. Zhukov depicts Stalin as a democrat whose reform-minded program was blocked by the "conservative" Politburo in 1937. Those two authors are no marginals and their books are widely read. Their main position, stressing geopolitics and ignoring the ideological factor, is widespread among most Russian historians today.

The consequences of this biased, watered-down representation of stalinism are very serious. The aggressivity of the communist regime, both domestically and in international relations, is occulted. The blame for the cold war falls mostly on the West. If the Soviet regime has realised so many wonderful achievements, it can have been brought down only by a plot from the outside, due to a decline in vigilance after Stalin's death. The drive toward independance of Russia's neighbors can be explained only by the undercover activities of foreign agents infiltrated in the NGOs.

The resilience of the stalinist worldview is obvious in many recent speeches of president Putin. In the first speech he gave following the September 2004 Beslan school seizure, Putin declared: "We have been weak, and the weak are beaten", echoing Malenkov in 1946: "We must remain strong because we know what happens to the weak: they are beaten". According to Putin, efforts to "tear off a big chunk of our country" are being assisted by those who "think that Russia, as one of the greatest nuclear powers of the world, is still a threat, and this threat has to be eliminated."

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<sup>3</sup> Interfax, January 25, 2006

<sup>4</sup> COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONDEMNS COMMUNISM OVER MOSCOW'S OPPOSITION By [Vladimir Socor](#) *Eurasia Daily monitor*, 27/01/06

<sup>5</sup> V. Karpov, *Generalissimus*, Kaliningrad, 2002

<sup>6</sup> Ju. N. Zukov, *Inoj Stalin*, Moskva 2003





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Vladislav Sourkov, Putin's chief ideologist, was even blunter: "The foreign intervention aims at destroying the Russian state... We must understand that the enemy is at our gate." In his seventh annual address, Putin called for a military buildup to counter the might of "Comrade Wolf, ... who is not about to listen to anyone", comrade Wolf being the US. As we remember, during meetings with foreigners or Politburo members, Stalin used to doodle wolves on his writing pads, representing his enemies. It seems Putin's imagination works on similar lines.

The wish to rewrite history, and worse still, to impose this slanted interpretation of the past to Western historians is obvious in Russian foreign minister Lavrov's recent article in *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* (March 6, 2006). Lavrov teaches us that "The slide toward the cold war, as confirmed by archive documents and studies by objective historians, was at least a two-way process **for which the US and Britain bore much of the blame**. The choice they made, based on premises that for the most part have not been justified, in reality initiated the creation of a new bipolar world order. The policy of the USSR throughout the second half of the 1940s, for all its toughness, was in **many ways defensive** and in its own way had a consistent and predictable character. [...] It was aimed at creating a protective belt of friendly states along the western borders, gaining access to the World Ocean and ensuring maximum defense depth all along the perimeter." This is exactly the line of propaganda which was successfully fed to the Roosevelt administration, including the use of the word "friendly states" meaning communised satellites! But let's go back to Lavrov's historical lessons: "During the war, the US and Britain showed a tolerant attitude to the geopolitical claims of the USSR, recognized the legitimacy of its security interests and adhered to the course of integrating the USSR into the Western community. The Victory dramatically changed the attitude of the Allies to the Soviet security interests." Again, no word about Stalin's ruthless communization of Eastern Europe, which was the real cause of the Cold War. The change of attitude of the Western countries is ascribed to the fact that they did not need the USSR any longer after the defeat of Germany. And finally, Lavrov has the nerve to accuse the West of the totalitarian regime in Russia, implying that if the West had given Stalin and his successors what he wanted, avoiding "confrontation", the USSR would have become a model democracy: "The course for isolating and wearing down the USSR through arms race, on which the West embarked, visited severe hardship on the Soviet people and extended the existence of the Stalinist system. The conditions of a "hostile encirclement" and a constant threat to the country's security provided a justification for total control of the authorities over society and economic inefficiency of the system."

Geopolitics is not the only device used to camouflage the criminal nature of communism. Many Russian authors attempt to deny the totalitarian essence of communism. They show that "pluralism" existed in the Soviet Union, even at the level of the Central Committee. In his Memoirs Primakov shamelessly describes himself and his colleagues of the IMEMO as "inside dissidents"<sup>7</sup> trying unsuccessfully to reform the Soviet system during the seventies. Primakov explains

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<sup>7</sup> See E. Primakov, *Gody v bolshoj politike*, M. 1999



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quite frankly why this version is so important: it is the only way to save the idea of convergence, to establish a link with the Western left. The Soviet system is depicted as intrinsically “pluralistic” and therefore no different in nature from a Western democracy. Once this postulate is accepted, the cold war becomes a geopolitical rivalry between two morally equivalent superpowers.

As during the communist regime, in Putin’s Russia theoretical elaborations are soon followed by organizational measures. Last June the Russian President met with a selected group of delegates attending a Kremlin-organized conference, “Timely Issues in Teaching Modern History and Social Science.” Putin told the teachers in typical KGB style: “Many school books are written by people who work to get foreign grants. They dance to the polka that others have paid for. You understand? These books, regrettably, get into schools and universities.” According to Putin, new history textbooks should “make our citizens, especially the young, proud of their country” ... “no one must be allowed to impose the feeling of guilt on us.” “Yes, we had terrible pages in Russia’s history,” he said. “Let us recall the events since 1937, and let us not forget that. But in other countries [the U.S.], it has been said, it was more terrible.” Putin suggested that Washington’s use of nuclear weapons against Japan at the end of World War II was worse than Stalin’s political repression and mass murder. In a way reminiscent of classical Soviet propaganda, Putin also cited the U.S. bombing campaign and use of the defoliant Agent Orange during the Vietnam War<sup>8</sup>. Putin pledged to hand out government grants to authors who will write proper new textbooks. He warned that publishing houses that did not print more patriotic textbooks would face state censorship. Following Putin’s call, the Duma promptly proposed a law according to which history textbooks have to be registered by a state commission.

Worse still, the Russian leadership is trying to impose in the West this revisionist interpretation of the past. Moscow has a trump card in this respect: the selective declassifying of archives. For instance, obscure memoranda by Litvinov or Maisky are being offered to historians in order to prove that “moderate” opinions existed in the stalinist establishment and to illustrate the “pluralist” structure of the USSR. All kind of sociological studies dedicated to Soviet “society” under Stalin are encouraged. But the documents linked to the evil core of Soviet power, the personal archives of Stalin, are still kept under wraps and one has the feeling the Kremlin regrets now bitterly that so many important files were imprudently made available to historians under Yeltsin.

Thus the cover-up of communist crimes, the denial of the totalitarian essence of the Soviet regime in contemporary Russia are linked to the chauvinist and imperialistic tendencies which are flourishing under Putin. Refusal to come to terms with the past has led to the emergence of a KGB state. The Kremlin is deeply wrong if it thinks that obfuscating the past reinforces Russia on the international scene: on the contrary, this attitude reinforces the distrust of Russia’s neighbors toward Moscow. It condemns Russia to a repetition of the mistakes of the past, the

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<sup>8</sup> [www.kremlin.ru](http://www.kremlin.ru), June 21

overestimation of force and manipulation, the contempt for small states and Europe, the anti-american obsession, the cultivating of rogue states, the fostering of alliances with countries like China, potentially much more dangerous for Russia than the Western world.

## 2) The West

During the debate around the PACE resolution mentioned above, Russia's delegation enlisted the support of a sizeable contingent of left-leaning European Socialists, hardline leftists, and residual communists to fight the report. In negotiations prior to the vote, this bloc managed to delete or dilute some formulations in the report, even expunging direct references to the Soviet Union. When the resolution passed, the left denounced “euromaccarthyism”: “This is nothing but a McCarthyist-style witch hunt on a grand scale across Europe, the rewriting of history and an all out propaganda offensive against communist and working class ideology”, wrote indignantly Peter Symon, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Australia in the *Guardian*<sup>9</sup>.

In the West amnesia of the communist crimes can be explained by the following reasons:

Revolutionary romanticism, fascination with the notion of revolution itself are more alive than ever, and not only in Latin America. In a country like France, any revolt, any protest, as absurd as they can be, are sanctified by this aura of rebellion. The media mentions with reverence any strike, any roadblock organized by protesting groups. Even the rampaging of the suburbs in november 2005 was shown in the media as a legitimate “revolt” against inequality. This revolutionary romanticism excuses the horrors of revolutions. Communism allegedly deserves amnesty because of its lofty ideals - as Kosachev puts it, echoing many in the West: “We principally disagree with the comparison of communism to Nazism. There are obvious differences in those ideologies. Nazism's goal was the happiness of one nation, the Aryan nation, at the expense of all the others. Communism tried to make all of humanity happy”.

Communist propaganda has left deep marks, and in a way is still alive even after it is no longer centrally orchestrated. All the paraphernalia of communist propaganda, “antifascism”, maccarthyism presented as the equivalent of stalinist terror, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism are still intact. The hold of this propaganda can be measured by the strength of ideological antiamericanism. Nostalgia for a “multipolar world” also plays a role in the voluntary downplaying of the communist crimes. It is strong not only among the left.

The third reason is moral relativism. Being “non-judgmental” is considered a democratic virtue. Drawing a distinction between good and evil is contrary to the main postulate of modern education and media, according to which all opinions are equivalent and have a right to exist.

The consequences of this frame of mind are very serious, and nowhere are they more visible than in France where, as a recent poll shows, 50% of the population doesn't believe that free enterprise is the best system for the future, where a hard core of Leninists is still able to influence the whole political spectrum. Cult for the French

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<sup>9</sup> 25 January, 2006



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revolution has led to contempt for the rule of law, especially private property rights. Spoliation is considered normal, passion for equality has extinguished love for freedom, voluntary servitude is accepted in the name of “social guarantees” and “solidarity”. For ex-president Chirac “liberalism [in the French sense of the word, i.e. free market ideology] is as dangerous as communism”. Remembrance of the communist experience would lead to hard questions. For those reasons Russian attempts to rewrite history fall here on a fertile soil. For the same reasons we have to remain dissidents.



## Appendix 2

**Conflict Transformation in Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia Cases**

Dr. George Khutsishvili, Director  
International Centre on Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN)  
Tbilisi, Georgia

There is a general consensus in Georgian society that European and Euro-Atlantic integration have no alternative and are essential for securing a safe and decent future of the country in a rapidly changing geo-political environment. However, it looks like public expectations for possible time-frames of getting MAP, and moreover, NATO membership are over-optimistic. There is active discussion in Georgia, as well as in Georgia-related international circles on how Georgia's NATO membership could be reconciled with unresolved conflicts on its territory, especially in regard to Abkhazia where the return of over 200,000 IDPs and progress in conflict resolution should take considerable time in all cases.

Encouragement and active support for Georgia's aspirations from Euro-Atlantic structures and the U.S. administration are obvious. Yet to the directly poised question "Is it realistic to expect inclusion in NATO of a country with unresolved internal conflicts?" the answer usually comes, "Generally, there are no prohibitions for that in the NATO Charter, so let us see..." A simple solution to this dilemma is that international community realistically assesses the time before Georgia's NATO membership as comparable to the time the country may need to achieve real progress in resolution of both conflicts (and this should not prevent Georgia from getting and fulfilling MAP anytime in the meanwhile). This also means that the progress in Euro-Atlantic integration will be supported and should not stop, but actual NATO membership for Georgia is not a matter of next few years. Before that time comes, Georgia is expected to demonstrate success in implementing economic and legal reforms, modernizing the army, building democratic institutions and law-based state. Progress should be seen in implementing the five-year EU action plan adopted in 2006, developing cooperation with ENP countries, and, last but not least, normalisation of Georgia's relations with Russia.

Although Russian Embassy in Tbilisi resumed its work after the fall 2006 crisis, there is practically no air transportation, airmail exchanged or visas issued between the two countries. Complicated relations with Russia remain a stumbling block for a number of important issues, such as peaceful resolution of Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts where Russia remained the main custodian on behalf of the Countries – Friends of the UN Secretary General on Georgia in all post-war years. At the root of aggravated relations lies the strong perception in Georgia that since the inception of conflicts Russia had been responsible for the instigation of ethnic tensions that led to



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the impaired territorial integrity of the country.

Ethno-political conflicts are seldom to be blamed on one side, so in the Georgia case responsibility also rests with all parties involved, and ultra-nationalism risen in decline of the Soviet Union contributed to growing frictions in Georgian society.

To the present day, different pictures exist in Georgian society about what happened and why. What happened in 1992-93 is generally seen in Georgia as an internal civil clash provoked from outside, and the post-war situation – as a case of divided society (ousted ethnic Georgian population outside Abkhazia, on the one hand, and the Abkhaz and other ethnic groups remaining in Abkhazia, on the other), while in secessionist Abkhazia it is seen as national liberation as a result of war, and subsequent independent state-building confirmed by the 1998 referendum (where Georgian IDPs – majority of Abkhazia's pre-war population - did not participate). Russia has claimed to be an outsider-neutral at all times; yet in all post-conflict years (if we mean by conflict proper its high-intensity phase) Russia kept a biased position, supporting separatism and distributing Russian national passports in Abkhazian and South-Ossetian population, at first as a humanitarian action to facilitate travelling abroad and getting Russian pensions. Later all the population having Russian passports were declared Russian citizens subject to protection by Russian law. Russian ruble is the official currency in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. All this had been done unilaterally, without Georgia's consent. Considering the fact that Russia officially shares the unanimous position of international community that these are internal conflicts of Georgia, Russia is kept responsible by Georgia for pursuing double standards and interfering in internal affairs of the country.

In view of recurrent crises and the currently existing tension, Russian role in maintaining status quo of the “frozen conflicts” is assessed in Georgia in a negative way. However, Georgia's concerns are usually “understood” but seldom officially shared in international organisations' documents. All UN Security Council resolutions, including the latest 1716 (2006) and 1752 (2007), assess the role of CIS (actually Russian) peacekeeping forces stationed in the zones of conflict as constructive and positive, meaning that without them the parties could resume hostilities. The internationally agreed negotiation formats for both conflicts have been Russian controlled and dominated. Ceasefire has been preserved, but the peace process froze. Under such circumstances, the only efficient way to register the required ‘positive dynamics’ with regard to conflicts might come as a result of changes in the negotiation format and selection of custodians: at this stage, it would be essential to make EU part of the negotiation format<sup>10</sup> with the mandate at least matching that of Russia.

There are strong negative attitudes in Russia towards the NATO expansion to the East: this is perceived there as direct threat both to international stability and national security of RF. Georgia's “intensive dialogue” with NATO and strategic partnership

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. also Background Paper on South Ossetia of the International Crisis Group (07.06.2007).



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with the U.S. further deepen Russia's alienation from Georgia. At the same time, Abkhazians who clearly see the advantages of their unique climatic and recreational zone would seek opportunities for Euro-integration, without giving in to Georgian conditions, of course. In such a situation, the recent decision that Sochi will be home for the 2014 Winter Olympics has immediately caused vivid discussions in both societies on how this might affect the stumbled conflict resolution process.

Contrary to the expected, President Saakashvili supported Sochi's candidacy prior to elections in Guatemala, and confirmed his positive attitude immediately thereafter, stressing that this would help keep the process in peaceful and civilised limits and open at the same time new opportunities for co-operation. Positive and negative scenarios of the consequences of Guatemala decision for the solution of Abkhazia conflict are being considered in Georgian society, with the (so far) prevailing view that this will make the whole process more dependent on Russia and less manageable from the Georgian side.

New opportunities for restarting Georgian-Abkhaz negotiations may appear as Abkhaz rethink their assessments of Russia as an almighty lord-protector of their (unrecognized) independent statehood. Russia could not prevent Georgia and NATO from moving toward each other, and when Georgia fulfills MAP and stands closer to membership, Abkhazia may get stuck as a kind of uncertain buffer zone at the NATO-RF border, with all the unpleasant consequences disastrous for its plans for developing tourist and resort businesses. Abkhazia needs to meet that stage with a clear orientation scheme and participation prospects, for which it needs to reach agreements about common formats of Euro-integration process with Georgia.

Otherwise, scenarios for possible progress in Georgian-Abkhaz relations remain unclear. Public diplomacy process actively developed by NGOs on both sides in second half of the 1990s faded out, as there was little political will to support and encourage it. Declared positions of the parties grew and still remain irreconcilable, and only scarce occasional contacts between small groups of civil society representatives happen from time to time. The Abkhaz only agree to meet with individual Georgians at the meetings that have Caucasian or international format.

In case systematic contacts between parties to conflict restart, track-two efforts are to play a serious role in confidence building and reconciliation.

***South Ossetia: Conflict Resolution without Negotiation?***

Western strategic partners of Georgia encourage and urge for direct dialogue between the parties to conflict in order to achieve progress in negotiations. Formally complying to that, the new leadership of Georgia who came to power after the "Rose Revolution" in November 2003 prefers to seek the unexplored ways to change the balance of forces and ensure new developments both in Abkhazia and South Ossetia without directly communicating with the adversary. In Abkhazia the mountainous



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Upper Kodori Gorge (never controlled by secessionists) has been made home for the “Abkhazia Legitimate Government in Exile” earlier stationed in Tbilisi. Upper Kodori Gorge had been renamed by Tbilisi to Upper Abkhazia to stress that now diarchy exists and the *status quo* no more holds in the conflict zone. Yet the project has re-stagnated again at that stage. In a more advanced and intricate form we can see this strategy being implemented towards South Ossetia.

It so happened that the borders of so-called Georgian-Osset conflict zone were designated as coinciding with the administrative borders of the pre-conflict South Osset Autonomous Oblast (abolished by the Georgian Parliament in late 1990). Contrary to Abkhazia where Inguri River turned into a natural dividing line between the communities, there were Georgian and Osset populated villages intermingled and there have always been territories within the Georgian-Osset conflict zone that were never fully controlled by the secessionist rule. So implementation of what I am dubbing as a “Sanakoev project” proved more feasible for the Georgian authorities in that territory. Three stages may be distinguished in that project implementation.

Stage One (completed): Participation of the Georgia-approved candidates in presidential elections declared by Tskhinvali de facto regime looked at that time as a political adventurism and legitimization of the de facto regime. Dimitry Sanakoev, former Prime Minister of the de facto government, wins the alternative elections in the parts of South Ossetia mostly populated by ethnic Georgians, and establishes an administrative centre in the town of Kurta. His victory is not acknowledged by Tskhinvali. He forms the government, calls himself elected president of the Republic of South Ossetia, and declares his course towards reunification with Georgia. Tbilisi in its turn acknowledges him as President of South Ossetia, establishes political and economic ties with Sanakoev administration and finally appoints him head of the newly established Provisional Administrative Unit on the territories he controls. Large-scale construction programmes developing on the Sanakoev side of conflict zone should demonstrate to the Tskhinvali community the advantages and support the Sanakoev administration enjoys. De facto status of the territories controlled by separatists remains the same, but diarchy is created in the conflict zone, its borders are changed, and the *status quo* is formally broken up.

Stage Two (ongoing): Tbilisi continues to refuse to talk to Kokoity (head of de facto authorities) and promotes Sanakoev as the alternative and preferred representative of the ‘other side’ in conflict. International community is offered to recognize Sanakoev as a legitimate leader and representative of the party to conflict. IOs are reluctant, they keep pointing at the Tskhinvali regime as one Tbilisi has a problem with, and has to deal with. But Tbilisi is not planning to include Kokoity in the game, rather the opposite. Sanakoev is promoted to talk at official EU and CoE meetings in Brussels, and EC is offered to redirect its aid of c.8 million Euros from Tskhinvali to Kurta. The Tbilisi plan aims at legitimizing Sanakoev and at the same time delegitimizing Kokoity in the eyes of international community to the extent that the former replaces the latter in the negotiation format. But it is not yet clear if this aim may be





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materialised soon.

Stage Three (to be finally reached): The current Tskhinvali regime should lose its representative status in peace negotiations, and Sanakoev (or whoever replaces him) should achieve the same status in regard to the entire territory of Georgian-Osset conflict zone. Erosion and delegitimization of the ruling regime should be achieved non-violently in Tskhinvali. Public demands are to be registered in Tskhinvali to restore the autonomous status of South Ossetia within the Georgian state. After that the Georgian government and the Sanakoev administration on behalf of South Ossetia will sign reconciliation and reunification documents and South Ossetia becomes part of Georgia again. The conflict that lasted over 16 years will be formally resolved. Chances to finally realise this bold plan exist, but stay unclear, as no contours of the mechanism for its realisation are seen yet.

Even if the second stage is completed smoothly and without major obstruction or incidents, it is not clear when the final stage may be reached or how long it may take to fulfill it. The bright side of the things is that the first stage has been completed without violence; Kokoity's warning that Georgia was using the diarchy project for preparing for military intervention did not materialise. The dark side is that the Osset community in Tskhinvali turned out to get further intimidated and alienated from the Georgian one. North Ossetians activated their efforts to prove that they as a divided society should work towards reunification (obviously, within Russian Federation), although earlier they looked at different options in a more tolerant way.

Maintaining Russia's role as a main custodian of peace, the international community did not leave other option for Georgia than seeking ways for cooperating with Russia and actually buying her benevolence for solving the conflicts on Georgia's terms. This turned out practically impossible, although Shevardnadze had tried it repeatedly. For Russia it was far more important to preserve the pressure tools in South Caucasus than eliminate them with her own hands. The same international community is now encouraging Georgia to join NATO, as a result of which Russia is further alienated, and at the same time to demonstrate "positive dynamics" in a conflict resolution process dominated by Russia. Does it mean Georgia has a "mission impossible" to fulfill to get a badly needed breakthrough? Is that why unexplored and risky strategies appear on the geopolitical chessboard with real people involved?



## Appendix 3

**With regards to the issue on ‘frozen conflicts’.**

## Items of the presentation

*Jazykova A.A., Prof., Head of the Centre of the Mediterranean-Black Sea Region  
Institute of Europe at the Russian Academy of Science*

At the beginning of 2007 on the initiative of the USA, Great Britain and France a new draft resolution on Kosovo has been submitted for the review to the UN Security Council, according to which Belgrade and Pristine were given four months for the follow up of negotiations. Provided they did not agree among themselves, a slightly revised plan by the UN extraordinary representative Martti Ahtisaari on providing independence to Kosovo under provisional international control will be submitted to the UN Security Council. The suggested amendments to the draft resolution (in mid July) by the USA and Great Britain did not change much. In the main the latest version of the draft resolution does not change the essential position of the mentioned three regular members of the Security Council, and just delayed for a while the agreed among them solution of the issue on Kosovo. Russia and China (regular members of the SC too) consider it is necessary to continue the negotiations between the conflicting parties.

The issue of Kosovo has become actually one of the ‘neuralgic centres’ of the global politics, and what is also important the case leading to doubts and then to the revision of the essential principle of the international law – the principle of inviolability of borders. State borders between different countries according to the UN Regulations, the Final Act of the OSCE and many other international instruments, may be changed only following mutual agreements of the states. However, such agreement is not anticipated neither in the case of Kosovo, nor in other similar conflict areas, such as Georgia, Azerbajdjan and Moldova. And it might be quite possible that irrespective of the various causes of such conflicts, the ‘Kosovo case’ may become a dangerous case in supporting separatism of these and many other territories.

The tragic experience of the Second World War induced the global society to enforce the principle of inviolability of borders as one of the essential foundations of the international law, which allowed Europe to avoid many intergovernmental conflicts and ‘minor invasive wars’. The revision of this principle requires coordinated and well founded decision of the global community taking into consideration all possible consequences in breaching the principle of territorial integrity. When it is stated that the leaders of Kosovo ‘shall in any way seek for independence in gunfight’, this is actually an additional argument indicating that it is too early to provide independence for them. With regards to other regions in armed conflicts their new status may only be recognised only on the basis of the results of negotiations between the conflicting



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parties, i.e. following their mutual agreement.

Among the most common arguments in favour of supporting separatism are the statements that 'kosovary' (Abkhazians) will not be able to live together with Serbs, Georgians, etc., anyway'. However, it is well known that Albanian and Serbian peasants living on the cross-border area of the pre-war Yugoslavia cooperated without any problems in working on the fields, and over 40% of families in Abkhazia were mixed – Georgian/Abkhazian. The situation has changed not only because of the armed conflicts, but also as a result of mass nationalistic propaganda preceding such conflicts. Attention should be also given to another rather essential factor - the support given to the separatists from outside.

It seems that clear understanding of what is going on in Kosovo (also in Abkhazia and Pridnestrovje) was not formed neither among politicians nor in the international public opinion, and whether they are ready to take over the burden of independence. Responses to such questions regarding Kosovo may be gripped from a series of broadcasted discussions, organised on the TV of Pristine in 2005 – 2006, preceding international negotiations on the status of this region. According to the data revealed in the course of the discussion, it turns out that after the year of 1999, irrespective of the provided international support (on the first stage about 1 billion euro per year, reducing the amounts later), little has been done for the development of the economy. The facilities remained underdeveloped, railway is not functioning, small and medium enterprises needed for processing agricultural production were not established, corruption and lack of professional skills is prevailing among the local authorities. Participants of the discussion left aside other problems, actually leading Kosovo to the status of the 'grey zone' - drug trafficking and trading in guns. It should not be left out of attention that such characteristics apply also and to other above mentioned regions, which could also be addressed as 'grey zones'. As in Abkhazia, as in Kosovo major and essential proprietary issues remain unaddressed, which originated as a result of actual seizure of real estate and other objects of ownership that belonged to hundred thousands of temporarily displaced persons.

In 2004 a group of analytics of the European Union suggested an approved by the European Council plan for addressing the Kosovo problem on the grounds of the principle "Standards before Status", i.e. negotiations on status shall be preceded by the development of the functioning and operational state. The obligatory 'standards' have not been reached so far, accordingly, the issue of the status on the legal basis may not be solved either. The European Union has taken steps in searching for measures to regulate the delayed conflicts also in the post-soviet area, evidenced by the outcomes of the visit of P. Semnebi, the Extraordinary Representative of the EU, to the countries of the Southern Caucasus. However, here again, as in the case of Kosovo, the issue may not be finally solved without the coordination of positions between the leading countries of the West and Russia. In a wider sense the discussion turns around the search of mutually acceptable solutions for regulating similar



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conflicts and reaching consensus within the international community.

Leaders of the conflicting regions (former autonomic territories) consider that reasons leading to separatism were the absence of actual autonomic rights in the past, which placed local population in full dependence from the central authorities discrediting at the same time the definition of 'autonomy' as such. Even in such cases, when it does not correspond to the reality, the declared currently proposals on 'the widest autonomy' can hardly be taken as the basis for negotiations. The solution may be found in searching for another kind of status, having precedent in the global practice – associated membership, federacy, etc. – asymmetric regionalism in relations with bigger governmental institutions, to which just certain functions of internal issues and defence may be delegated while keeping the internationally recognized state borders. The obligatory condition shall become the return of temporarily displaced persons to the places of their previous residence (of those, who are willing to), also solution of all their proprietary issues and provision to the Centre of possibilities concerning their legal protection.



#### Appendix 4

### **Regulation of the „frozen“ regional crisis and the issue of „unrecognized“ states: analysis of the international experience (applicable for the conflicts on the post-soviet area)**

Julija Nikitina,  
Associate to the Centre of post-soviet research [НКСМИ МГИМО(У)],  
Academic at the Chair of global political processes [МГИМО(У)]

Conflicts in Pridnestrovje, Nagornij Karabach, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are in similar stages of development: the active phase of the conflicts was managed into the „frozen“ status, which in its own turn in the current stage of the development of political processes on the post-soviet area could be more appropriately qualified as the problem of „unrecognized“ or „de facto“ states: the final goal raised by the above mentioned formations is independence and recognition by the global community.

First of all it should be defined, what is the difference between the „de facto“ states and the separatist enclave, and may Pridnestrovje, Nagornij Karabach, South Ossetia and Abkhazia be qualified as „de facto“ states?

*Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States* (1933) sets the following criteria on the existence of a state:

- 1) permanent population;
- 2) defined territory;
- 3) government;
- 4) capacity to enter into relations with other states.

„Unrecognized states“ in CIS meet the first three criteria, but do not satisfy the last one. They do not possess the outside sovereignty, and the existence of the government does not correspond to the legitimate formation.

However, the so called “de facto” states have the following general characteristics:

- existence of the organised political government, which, as a rule, originates from the local environment and is favoured by the local population. Such government is usually taking an effective control over a respective territory for a considerable period of time, performing social and other functions normally performed by the government of a state.

- pursue full independency and wide international recognition as a sovereign state.



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“De Facto” state considers itself capable of entering into inter-governmental relations with other states (i.e. as satisfying the fourth criteria of the Montevideo Convention), even though existing under conditions of non-recognition by the international community. An unrecognized state does not have the legal status in the matters of international relations, as it does not possess legal rights on the occupied territory, as such territory according to legal grounds belongs legitimately to another state, which is internationally recognised.

There are many examples in the sphere of international relations on the formation of unrecognized states on the map of the globe. On the basis of such examples it is possible to elaborate a certain classification of approaches of the international community concerning the issues of unrecognized states:

- **Recognition on the informal level**

*Example:* Taiwan is officially recognised by no more than thirty states.

- **Ignoring**

*Example:* ignoring of the provisional government of Eritrea in the beginning of 1990-ies till the moment of conducting the referendum recognised by the international community and formation of an independent state. Ignoring of the Republic of Somaliland with regards to the North part of Somali. In 1991, following the failure of the regime of Siad Barre, Somali fell apart into tens of autonomic regions fighting among themselves, and Somaliland declared its independence. Differently from Somali, the Somaliland manages to keep peace and stability on its territory.

Ignoring leads to the enforcement of the status quo, leaving no motivation to the resolution of conflicts. It also helps to maintain the status quo, and the humanitarian aid supporting the population reduces the possibility at the same time of the social explosion or mass protests.

- **Economic sanctions and embargo**

*Example:* ban on import of agricultural products to the EU Member States by the self-proclaimed Republic of Turkey of the Northern Cyprus (which had a particularly negative impact in 1994 after the ban of export to the EU member states of citrus fruits and tomatoes – the two essential export cultures of the RTNC). Nagornyj Karabach is entrapped in the blockade from the side of Azerbajdjan and Turkey; sanctions of CIS are in force against Abkhazia, however, it has established strong bilateral relations and corresponding agreements with more than forty entities of the Russian Federation.

Economic sanctions lead to formation of illegal economy with the authorities and force structures in the conflict zones. In all unrecognized states the authorities



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stimulate smuggling referring to the fact that they do not bear any liabilities in the sphere of trading. With the help of smuggling local elite provide themselves with substantial maintenance. During the period of conflicts the shadow economy and smuggling have become part of the mode of life in the unrecognized formations, and the longer the regulation of their status lasts the more complicated it becomes to transfer their economies into the healthy course.

- **Use of military force for liquidating the formations**

*Example:* occupation of Chorvatia by the self-declared republic of “Serbskaja Kraina”; liquidation of Adjaria as an independent formation.

It might seem that in the case of “frozen” conflicts on the post-soviet area, Russia and the international society could make use of the fifth approach – policy of involvement – the interim version between the ignored unrecognized states and their destruction.

Such policy includes:

- withdrawal of embargo and economic sanctions from the outside international society;
- involvement into legal economic relations;
- democratic processes, anti-criminal actions among the elite and the local population;
- raising attractiveness of economic models in Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbajdžan aimed at integration into economic separatist formations;
- full participation in the EU, and probably NATO during the process of negotiations related to the formation of motivation to the regulation of conflicts between the conflicting parties.

Let’s have a closer look at the factors leading to resolution of the „frozen“ conflict and directing towards the course of „policy of involvement“:

**Internal Factors:**

**- New Governments**

*Example:* in South Africa de Klerk and N. Mandela acted in the role of peacemakers. In the Balkans – a totally opposite example, where the leaders prevented the possibility of peace. In Georgia, when Saakashvili came to power, the issue of Adjaria was solved leading to the probability of “defrosting” conflicts in South Osetia and Abkhazia.



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The internal inertia of the conflict, defined by the weakness of democratic institutions, and striving of the regimes to strengthen their powers, leads to the delay of regulation. Taking into account the actual irreversibility of the elite in the unrecognized formations, it seems quite logical, that lack of political will of the key actors in changing the status quo may be useful for one side or the other in coming to power. Entering into agreement with the existing authorities would mean the strengthening of the present situation.

However, there are also negative consequences for Russia in the change of the elite: in the post-soviet area the change of the old, the soviet yet, elite, which is politically and culturally oriented towards Moscow, into the new – pro-western oriented elite, is currently taking place. The essential lapse of Russia is that it could not prepare the new generation of the national elite and establish good relationship with it thereon. A gradual reformation and redirection of the new independent states is taking place currently towards the USA, Europe, China and Asian countries, because of the lack of clear and elaborated policy of Russia related to the relations with the CIS states. Moreover, the model of the economic and political development of Russia becomes less and less attractive.

**- Growth of the economic attractiveness of the “metropolitan” state, from which “independent” territories have separated**

In separate cases a slow process of reunion might be possible under the condition of very successful development of the “metropolies” capable of becoming magnets and with the participation of international mediators, though such chances are reducing with every year.

*Example:* the economic capacity of Marocco is attractive for the Western Sahara - almost half of the population is employed in Marocco. That’s why Western Sahara most probably will be in the nearest future recognised not only de facto, but also de jure, as a part of Marocco. Northern Cyprus sooner or later will come into reunion with the Republic of Cyprus (an EU Member already), and will be inevitably obliged to observe the rules of the Republic of Cyprus, the economic attractiveness of which is undeniable.

Accordingly, given Georgia, Moldova and Azerbajdjan will not be able to prove their attractiveness by their economic achievements it will be too difficult for them to get back the separatist territories in the peaceful way.

**Internal factors:**

**- Involvement in the negotiations with the EU and/or NATO. The perspective of joining these organisations**

*Example:* conflict in Cyprus. Actually the perspective of Cyprus in joining the EU





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helped the government of the Turks-Cypriots to form the constructive position. However, the referendum according to the plan suggested by the UN on the eve of joining the EU failed as a result of opposition by the Greeks- Cypriots. Reluctance to unite is related to the fact that the plan of Cofi Annan was more pro-turkish concerning the issues related to the return of territories, property and compensations to the Turks-Cypriots, as Turkey has refused from reimbursements from the start. Nevertheless, the possibility of joining the EU was the essential stimulus for activating the negotiations.

The form of negotiations in the case of conflicts on the post-soviet area has been changing since the beginning of 1990. It is necessary to include into the process of negotiations the EU and NATO, the interests of which in the region have increased undoubtedly. Moldova, Azerbajdjan and Georgia are in close cooperation with both organisations and are seeking to become members of one or the other organisation in the future, therefore full participation of the EU and/or the NATO in the negotiations may encourage the parties to reach compromise.

Subsequently, participation of such organisations in the role of mediators should not be considered as restriction of the interests of Russia – both the EU and the NATO are interested in the regulation of the legal status of the “black holes”, through which the flows of smuggling find their way to Europe. It is necessary to understand that the task for the EU and the NATO is not the reduction of the influence of Russia on the post-soviet area, but the mitigation of instability within the borders of the united Europe answering the interest of Russia as well.

*Example: participation of the EU in the regulation of the Pridnestrovje conflict.*

In response to the joint request of the Ukrainian and the Moldovan Governments in 2005 the European Union agreed to send out specialists for observing the security of borders between the Ukraine and Moldova on the territory of the self-declared republic of Pridnestrovje. The EU task in this case was to reduce the flows of smuggling going to Europe through Pridnestrovje.

However, it should be noted, that expectations of the conflict parties with regards to the mediation or internal involvement are in most cases exaggerated. Following the negotiations for many years, essential alternative versions of regulating the conflict, as a rule, are laid down on the table of negotiations. Accordingly, each party is awaiting that the mediator is simply going to force another party of the conflict to agree to its conditions. It is related to the fact that the participants of the conflict treat the negotiations as the game with a zero stake (when one wins, the other is definitely losing). The task of mediators in this case is to convince the participants of the negotiations that it is not possible to reach agreements, which could at the same time fully satisfy the interests of each of the party. Participants shall be aware they have no other choice - just to reach a consensus through mutual yielding. Experts often suggest making use of the experience in the DEITON agreements: the final stage of



peace negotiations in Bosnia and Hercegovina was carried out under a heavy pressure of American diplomacy. Participants of the negotiations were actually isolated from the outside world and the American side made use of the direct pressure. However, reference to the example of "imposed" agreements in this case is not relevant since the discussion then was related to the regulation of the "hot" conflict.

### **- Withdrawal of sanctions**

*Example:* on the eve of joining of the Greek part of Cyprus to the EU, taking into consideration the positive voting of Turks-Cypriots, Brussels promised to allocate 260 million euro to the North Cyprus as economic support and made the embargo on import of goods from the unrecognized RTNC easier. Currently, goods from the North Cyprus are allowed to be transported through the "green line" to the south of the isle, from where they may be further directed to any EU member states without any limitations and customs duties. It should be noted that trade with RTNC is regulated by the European Commission and not the Government of Cyprus.

Withdrawal of sanctions and embargo will help the unrecognized states to enter into international economic relations, to increase the level of welfare of the population and to reduce social tension.

### **Methods of regulating the legal status of „de facto“ states**

There are two opposite approaches in regulating the „frozen“ conflicts.

*The first approach:* continue requesting for the territorial integrity of the states with „unrecognized formations“ on its own territory; to review the legal status of „unrecognized formations“ within the „metropolitan“ states taking into consideration the interests of national minorities.

*The second approach:* gradually, by way of reforms and democratisation, lead the „de facto“ states to the international recognition by putting the entire responsibility for the gained independence on them.

The question is, whether the so called „unrecognized“ states are striving for independence and recognition by the international society? Each of such formations has already managed to tune the functioning of the governmental system under the conditions of international isolation. The „unrecognized“ states are set for a long game, which, from their point of view, may last through decades. By ignoring such formations the international society makes it easier for them to keep in the status quo.

There is also a third possible approach to the regulation related to the true intentions of the „de facto“ states pursuing for independence. It seems independence is needed for them just for having a possibility to join Russia as is the case with Abkhazia, South Osetia and Pridnestrovje, or to Armenia in the case of Nagornyj Karabach. It is



obvious that resolution of their social-economic and ethnic-political problems citizens of such unrecognized states relate with Russia (evidence for this may be Russian passports obtained by them) or Armenia.

However, the third approach will make an irrevocable harm to the image of Russia and Armenia on the international arena.

**The first approach: change of the legal status of the ,unrecognized‘ formation within one state**

Let's have a look at different forms of governmental structures, which might be used for defining the status of the ,unrecognized‘ states in the post-soviet area.

Among the most important means for resolving ethno-national conflicts and providing rights to national minorities is the redistribution of competences along the vertical line referring to a corresponding territorial organisation – autonomisation, regionalisation and federalism.

*Examples of the national-territorial autonomy:*

- *Aland Islands:*

Aland islands have constitutional guarantees on the territorial integrity, own parliament and the Government with clearly defined and guaranteed powers, own citizenship. Borders of the autonomous territory may be changed only with the consent of the Aland Parliament. Citizens of the Aland Islands are at the same time also citizens of Finland, however Finish citizens, even those, who have settled on the Aland Islands, cannot receive the citizenship of the Aland Islands automatically.

- *Greenland:*

In 1985 Greenland left the European Economic Community, but Denmark, a part of which Greenland is, continued its membership in the EU.

- *Scotland:*

The autonomy of Scotland within the framework of Great Britain was formed even at the beginning of the 18th century – Scotland had its own legal and judicial system, but at the same time did not have its own legislative and executive bodies. Participation in taking political decisions was given to the representation on common grounds in the House of Commons and a special representation in the House of Lords. Due to constitutional reforms own Parliament and the Government were instituted in Scotland.



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*Federal formation:*

There are two types of federations – constitutional and conventional.

Most federal states in the world refer to the *constitutional type* of federations, i.e. following the distribution of competences between the centre and parts of the federation set by the constitution without the right of secession.

Examples of *conventional federations* (SSSR, Yugoslavia, The United Arab Republic, Federation of Mali, and Federation of Central American Republics) evidence poor vitality of this model.

In most cases the territorial principle is the basic condition for federations (for example, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Mexico, USA and FRG). However, there are examples of countries, where subjects of federations are defined referring to the composition of local residents with regards to nationality, ethnic origin, religion and language.

*Examples:*

- *Canada* – 9 English speaking provinces and one – French speaking (Quebec).
- *India* – the linguistic principle of division to the states (there are monolingual, bilingual and monolingual states).
- *Belgium* – consists of regions (Wallonia, Flemish and Brussels) and communities (French, Flemish and German speaking Community). Alongside there are four linguistic regions (region of the French language, region of the Dutch language, the bilingual region of Brussels – the Capital and the German speaking region).
- *Switzerland* is formally structured according to the territorial principle (23 cantons), however, the national composition of cantons is, as a rule, rather homogeneous (population in Switzerland speak in four languages). Cantons have a considerably high level of independence and have guarantees from the Government on the federal level.
- *Ethiopia* – is one of the youngest federations in the world: legal basis of the federal structure was laid down in the Constitution adopted by the Parliament of the country in December 1994. By now the decentralisation of governmental powers is the only way of saving the country from full fall, which started in 1993 with the separation of Eritrea, the former province of Ethiopia, and may continue with the separation of other regions, where the armed separatist movements exist for several decades already.

*Example of peaceful secession:* after thirty years of fighting Eritrea has voted in 1993



at the referendum for the independence of the country from Ethiopia. It should be noted that the outcome of the referendum was recognised by the authorities of Ethiopia itself leading to the recognition of the Eritrea as an independent state by the international community.

*Institution of federal intervention:*

An Institution of federal or governmental intervention exists in most modern federations on the globe and in quite a few of unitary states.

Example: states of Latin America. Federal intervention is enforced by the President of the Republic. Basis: disagreements in the economic policy of the government and the state; a conflict between the states; threat to the security of the state, or threats to the elected authorities; violation by the state of the federal constitution and the law. President issues a special decree (approved or not by the authorities of the state), where he indicates the reasons of intervention, the duration of it, and appoints the „responsible executive on intervention“ (intervento). The latter is fully authorised by the authorities to dismiss the government of the state and, provided other sources were exhausted, strengthen his actions with military forces. In the case of using military forces, the responsibility lies directly on the President personally.

It should be noted that autonomy as well as any other legal and political mechanism is only effective if followed by certain conditions. Only the disposition of both parties in search for half-way solutions lead to the regulation of conflicts and the development of optimal or relatively optimal model for self-government of national minorities.

**The second approach: gradual recognition of independence**

Assessing the efficiency of governance in former colonies, who gained their independence in 1960, it may be noted, that most of them did not develop into independent states, though are represented in the UN. The efficiency of governance in unrecognized formations on the post-soviet area is often on a higher level than in some African states. Therefore, provided the union is not possible, it is necessary to look for other alternatives in recognising the unrecognized formations as states obligating them with full responsibilities.

So far as full legal recognition of independence of the „de facto“ states is rather complicated, there are some interim alternatives too.

*Association*

*Examples of „freely associated states“:* Greenland with Denmark; Belau with the USA; Niue, Cook Island with New Zealand. Under such form of association the states have their internal sovereignty (supremacy over their own territory), but refuse for the benefit of the „governing state“ from the external sovereignty (i.e.



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independence of formation from the other state is not recognised in the constitutional order). Experience of such legal division may be useful in regulating conflicts on the post-soviet area. Actually, lack of interim forms of sovereignty push the separatist states into pursuing for full independence.

*Confederation*

Confederation is a form of governmental structure, where governmental formations within the confederation are entitled to their own sovereignty. Relations between the subjects of the confederation are actually based on agreements. Authorities of the confederation are only empowered with such functions, which were delegated to them by the subjects of the confederation.

As a rule, confederation is a transitional form of the governmental formation, which is developed for a short period time and is aimed at addressing certain issues of the society (consolidation of efforts in one or the other sphere of activities: internal or external policy, economics, etc.). Confederation has no governing bodies of its own, in most cases advisory, monitoring or controlling bodies are established.

*Examples of artificially established confederations:*

- Bosnia and Hercegovina – process of integration of three mono-ethnic communities (Chorvats, Bosnians and Serbs).
- Serbia and Montenegro – Kosovo problem; after the referendum Montenegro gained independence in 2006.

Despite the fact that examples of establishing confederations are not too successful, such alternative of regulation should not be ignored. The establishment of a confederation may be a transitional stage on the way to full independence.

And finally, there is a possibility *to recognise* independence of the discussed formations by the international community on *the informal level* – as in the case of Taiwan, for example. Accordingly, it could be possible with regards to further movement towards official recognition, and towards the reunion with the „metropolitan“ state.

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Subsequently, several scenarios exist for the development of relations between the unrecognized states and the metropolitan states, as well as reactions of the international community towards actions of the first or the second on overcoming critical junctions. With regards to the post-soviet area the most optimal scenario for gradual and peaceful management of the status quo by way of raising the status of the candidates to the independence of the territory within a single state by a possible



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intervention of outside forces (e.g. EU) and necessarily taking into consideration the position of Russia. However, it seems that the critical factor in the development of actions around the unrecognized states on the post-soviet area will depend on the case of Kosovo, which will then decide the vector of mutual relations of the „de facto“ states with the international community and the metropolitan states for the nearest future.

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## Appendix 5

**List of participants**

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>
1.	Adomėnas Mantas	President, Institute of Democratic Policy
2.	Adzinba Shamili	Deputy Chairman, Committee for Youth and Sport Affairs, Abkhazia region
3.	Ališauskas, Vytautas	Expert of the Institute of Democratic Policy
4.	Anishchenko Svetlana	Post-graduate, Nizhny Novgorod State University
5.	Aptsiauri David	Ambassador, Embassy of Georgia, Vilnius
6.	Bobkovich Yauhen	Member of the Board, Youth Christian Social Union “Young Democrats”, Minsk
7.	Bondari Petru	Student, Economic Law Department, Perspectiva University, Chisinau
8.	Borin Oleksandr	Regional youth organization “Proryv”, Simferopol
9.	Buival Valery	Conservative Christian Party – Belarusian Popular Front, Minsk
10.	Buligari Andrian	Graduating student, Faculty of International Relations, State University of Moldova, Chisinau
11.	Gvindzhya Maxim	Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abkhazia region
12.	Chernysheva Oxana	Editor-in-chief, Information Agency “Regnum Baltika”, St.Petersburg
13.	Ciornii Ion	Embassy of Moldova
14.	Ciurea Cornel	Lecturer, Institute for Political Studies and International Relations of Moldova, Chisinau
15.	Čekuolis Jonas	Chairman, Commission for NATO, Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius
16.	Daukšts Bonifacijs	Counsellor, Embassy of Latvia in the Republic of Lithuania
17.	Davidonis Ramūnas	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, Department of Security Policy, advisor to the NATO division
18.	Dobychin Alexey	Coordinator, International youth organization “Proryv”, Moscow
19.	Dukhnich Olga	Post-graduate student, Taurida National University, Simferopol
20.	Dzenisevich Andrei	Member of the Board, Youth Christian Social Union “Young Democrats”, Minsk
21.	Efros Ion	Student, Faculty of International Relations, State University of Moldova, Chisinau
22.	Erofeeva Polina	Post-graduate, Nizhny Novgorod State University
23.	Gusuev Valeriy	Student, Mariupol State Humanitarian University
24.	Guzun Victor	Chairman, Republican party youth organization “Molodezhnoe obnovenie”, Tiraspol
25.	Haran Oleksiy	Professor, Kyiv Mohyla Academy
26.	Ilievici Denis	Vice-chairman, Republican party youth organization “Molodezhnoe obnovenie”, Tiraspol
27.	Janulevičius Giedrius	Crisis management centre, Ministry of Defense of Lithuania, Vilnius.
28.	Jastramskis Mažvydas	Centre of Strategic Studies





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29.	Kačinskas Rolandas	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, Department of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Head of the Russian division
30.	Karabeshkin Leonid	Chairman, The Baltic Club, St.Petersburg
31.	Khutsishvili George	Director, International Center on Conflict and Negotiation, Tbilisi
32.	Kriaučionytė Lina	Staff member, Center for Geopolitical Studies, Vilnius
33.	Kriščiūnas Kęstutis	Adviser to the Minister, Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania
34.	Kungurova Maria	Head of Section, Committee of Sports, Tourism and Youth Policy, the Government of Leningrad Oblast, St.Petersburg
35.	Kuzmin Nikita	Post-graduate, Russian State University, Kaliningrad
36.	Kuznetsov Boris	Director, The Centre of International and Regional Policy, St.Petersburg
37.	Prof. Landsbergis Vytautas	Member, European Parliament
38.	Lerhis Ainars	Researcher, Centre for East European political Studies, Riga
39.	Levandovska Liliya	Researcher-conflictologist, the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, Kyiv
40.	Lukošūnaitė Živilė	Administrator, Center for Geopolitical Studies, Vilnius
41.	Manole Olga	Head of the Organizational Development Department, Promo-lex Association, Moldova
42.	Martynov Alexey	Executive Secretary, Inter-parliamentary Assembly of non-recognized states, Moscow
43.	Megreleshvili Ekaterine	Editor of weekly analytical bulletin "SCIRS-Ponedelnik", Tbilisi
44.	Mezhevich Nikolay	Director, Centre of Transborder Studies, School of International relations, St. Peterburg State University
45.	Otkhmezuri Konstantine	Senior Research Fellow, ICCN, Tbilisi
46.	Peyter Ruslan	Intern, The Committee of the Foreign Affairs, Verhovna Rada of Ukraine, Kyiv
47.	Pleshchenko Denis	Project Manager, Center of International and Regional Policy, St.Petersburg
48.	Radzevičiūtė Aušra	Staff member, Center for Geopolitical Studies, Vilnius
49.	Rockiki Robert	Second Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Lithuania
50.	Saldžiūnas Vaidas	Student, War and Security Studies, Hull University, Great Britain
51.	Sanakoev Alexey	Chairman, Union of Patriotic Youth "Ir" of Southern Ossetia region
52.	Semenov Maxim	Director, Valdai Information Centre, Velikij Novgorod
53.	Sergeeva Marina	Ms Student, Eurouniversity, Tallinn
54.	Sulkhanishvili Irene	Program Coordinator, International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN), Tbilisi
55.	Tabueva Medeya	Committee for Youth Affairs of Southern Ossetia region
56.	Tarielashvili Tea	Parliament of Georgia, Tbilisi
57.	Tučkutė Greta	Director, Centre for Geopolitical Studies, Vilnius
58.	Tumanov Boris	Author of articles in journal "New Times"
59.	Urbonaitė Eglė	Student, Institute of International Relations and Politics, Vilnius



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60.	Urbonaitė Rima	Center for Strategic Studies, Vilnius
61.	Viačiorka Vincuk	Chairman, the Belarussian Popular Front Party, Minsk
62.	Volovoj Vadim	Expert, Center for Geopolitical Studies, Vilnius
63.	Vrabie Radu	Program Coordinator, Foreign Policy Association of Moldova, Chisinau
64.	Zemele Laima	